
































The European Union (EU) and Russia may seem strange bedfellows 
in Central Asia given the ongoing geopolitical rivalry between them.  
However, starting from the double observation that they share an 
interest in a stable, prosperous and secure Central Asia, and that they 
have very complementary expertise and capabilities in areas in which 
they are both already active, this policy brief argues that cooperation 
between the EU and Russia holds significant potential in terms of 
amplifying their contribution to the stability and prosperity of the 
region.  
After outlining the EU’s and Russia’s common interests in Central 
Asia, as well as the formal basis for possible cooperation, this policy 
brief identifies opportunities for cooperation through both bilateral 
and multilateral channels. Possible areas for cooperation include soft 
security issues (e.g. drugs trafficking and water management), hard 
security issues (e.g. the fight against extremism), and sustainable 
development.  
The policy brief ends by highlighting the barriers for actual 
cooperation before offering concrete policy recommendations on 
how to overcome these obstacles.  
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Introduction 
If one starts from the observation that the 
European Union (EU) and Russia have a 
common interest in a stable, prosperous and 
secure Central Asia, then the question arises 
why they would not consider joining forces in 
order to help make Central Asia thrive and 
prosper. The answer seems obvious - not only 
do their bilateral relations remain at an all-time 
low, they also share a lack of trust and have a 
mutual suspicion of each other’s goals and 
involvement in a region which Russia still 
considers its backyard and crucial to ensure its 
great power status.  
Despite these seemingly insurmountable 
obstacles to collaborating, the idea of possible 
cooperation in Central Asia should not be 
disregarded so easily. Indeed, in a number of 
specific policy areas, cooperation between the 
EU and Russia holds significant potential in 
terms of contributing to the stability and 
prosperity of the region because of the strong 
complementarity of their expertise and 
capabilities. Moreover, the EU’s and Russia’s 
objectives and interests in Central Asia collide 
to a much lesser extent than in Eastern Europe 
and the South Caucasus. Central Asia is not a 
strategic priority for the EU, and it does not have 
the ambition to become a leading actor in the 
region. Therefore, both the EU and Russia have 
shown some willingness to cooperate in light of 
their overlapping interests in specific areas. 
In what follows, this policy brief first outlines the 
EU’s and Russia’s common interests in Central 
Asia, as well as the formal basis for possible 
cooperation. Next, it identifies opportunities for 
cooperation through both bilateral and 
multilateral channels. Possible areas for 
cooperation include soft security issues (e.g. 
drugs trafficking and water management), hard 
security issues (e.g. the fight against extremism), 
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and sustainable development. The policy brief 
ends by highlighting the main barriers for actual 
cooperation before offering concrete policy 
recommendations on how to overcome these 
obstacles. 
Converging Interests  
The interests of the EU and Russia in Central 
Asia converge to the extent that they both want 
Central Asia to be a stable, secure and 
prosperous region (Juraev 2014; Sattarov 2018; 
Prandin 2019). Moreover, both actors have an 
interest in containing security threats in the 
region, which is reflected in their involvement in 
the spheres of border management, anti-drugs 
trafficking, environmental protection, 
counterterrorism and prevention of 
radicalisation. Although having converging 
interests is not a sufficient condition for possible 
collaboration, it does raise the question 
whether cooperation is possible.  
Formally, there is currently no cooperation 
between the EU and Russia in Central Asia. 
However, there is an ongoing dialogue on 
Central Asia between EU and Russian officials at 
various levels in the form of an exchange of 
information. Overall, these contacts are said to 
be quite positive and constructive in nature.1 At 
a senior diplomatic level, there are bilateral 
consultations on general affairs between the EU 
Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia 
and his Russian counterpart, Deputy Foreign 
Minister of Russia, Grigory Karasin. While these 
consultations used to take place annually, in 
recent years they have increased in frequency 
and now take place bi-annually. During the 
preparation of the EU’s new strategy for Central 
Asia, the EUSR briefed his Russian counterparts 
on several occasions. There are also 
consultations at more technical levels on 
specific issues, including on counterterrorism 
and on drug trafficking. The latter, for instance, 
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takes place in the framework of the Central 
Asian Regional Information and Coordination 
Centre for Combating Drugs Trafficking 
(CARICC). The question is whether these 
contacts could go a step further and result in 
effective cooperation on the ground.  
Is Cooperation Possible? 
There is a widely held perception (including 
among Russian policymakers) that the EU does 
not want to cooperate with Russia. While it is 
true that the EU remains cautious about the idea 
of cooperating with Russia, from an EU 
perspective there are, in fact, two key factors 
that in principle make cooperation with Russia 
in Central Asia possible. 
First, EU officials believe that it would be in the 
EU’s interest to cooperate with Russia in Central 
Asia.2 EU officials think that cooperation would 
be beneficial in certain areas where both the EU 
and Russia are active. For certain policy areas, 
such as border management and anti-drugs 
trafficking, EU officials acknowledge that joining 
forces would amplify the likelihood of having a 
positive and lasting effect compared to when 
both parties act separately. Moreover, in some 
areas, the EU and Russia have complementary 
expertise and capabilities. By joining forces in 
those areas, EU officials think that this could 
create a win-win situation, with tangible benefits 
for the Central Asian countries.  
These acknowledgements are in line with what 
is laid down in the so-called “selective 
engagement” principle, which is one of the five 
principles that currently determine the EU’s 
position towards Russia (Council of the EU 
2016). Although the first of these five principles 
explicitly links any substantial cooperation with 
Russia to progress in terms of implementing the 
Minsk agreements, the ‘selective engagement’ 
principle allows for cooperation with Russia in 
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areas of common interest. Given the 
overlapping interests of the EU and Russia in the 
region, Central Asia hence emerges as a region 
where the principle of selective engagement 
could be applied, and thus where the EU could 
agree to cooperate with Russia in those areas 
that are of interest to the EU.  
A second factor that points to the possibility of 
cooperation with Russia can be found in the new 
EU strategy for Central Asia, which was 
launched in May 2019 (European Union 2019). 
A key element of the new strategy is the aim to 
forge what it labels a “non-exclusive” 
partnership with the countries of Central Asia. 
This means that the EU is ready to establish new 
synergies and strengthen existing synergies 
with other external actors active in the region. 
The new EU strategy thus leaves an important 
opening for possible cooperation with Russia, 
even if Russia is not mentioned explicitly in the 
strategy. This is also acknowledged by the EU 
officials that were interviewed for this policy 
brief.  
Possible Areas for 
Cooperation 
Four areas stand out when it comes to possible 
cooperation between the EU and Russia in 
Central Asia: border management, anti-drugs 
trafficking, water management, and 
environmental protection, including the 
mitigation of the effects of climate change. 
These are areas in which both the EU and Russia 
are active in the region, and for which joining 
forces are expected to be beneficial, as it would 
avoid duplication and enhance the outcomes of 
their efforts because of the complementary 
expertise and capabilities that the EU and Russia 
have in these fields.3 
3 Interviews with EU officials, August-September 2019. See also 
Sattarov (2018) and Prandin (2019). 
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There are two more areas where cooperation 
could be possible, namely the areas of 
counterterrorism and prevention of 
radicalisation, and trade and regulatory 
convergence. However, cooperation in these 
areas is less likely to materialise in the short 
term. In the area of counterterrorism and 
prevention of radicalisation, the possibility of 
cooperation is compromised by the diverging 
understandings and approaches that the EU 
and Russia have in these fields. When it comes 
to trade and regulatory convergence, 
cooperation is in principle possible through 
alignment between the EU and the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU). However, while both 
Russia and the Central Asian member states of 
the EAEU, namely Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
have been advocating for this alignment, the EU 
is not willing to formally align itself with the 
EAEU. This refusal is not only due to the conflict 
in Ukraine, but also because the EU has several 
concerns about the incomplete nature of the 
EAEU as a customs and economic union 
(Bossuyt and Bolgova 2019). Nevertheless, EU 
officials do acknowledge the potential benefits 
of enhancing regional economic connectivity 
via EU-EAEU alignment. Therefore, EU officials 
believe that one should work towards 
convergence, or at least mutual recognition, of 
technical standards and trade procedures.4 
It should be noted that cooperation is also 
possible in the framework of regional and 
multilateral organisations. The organisations 
that appear most suitable are the UN and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). In the framework of the UN, 
cooperation is possible specifically on 
counterterrorism and prevention of 
radicalisation, namely through the Office of 
Counter-Terrorism (OCT), drug trafficking, 
namely through the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNOD), and sustainable 
development, namely through the United 
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Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The 
OSCE, in turn, offers a suitable platform for 
cooperation between the EU and Russia on 
border security. Cooperation in the framework 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO) could also be envisaged, however, for the 
time being, this does not seem likely to take 
place. EU officials believe that there is a 
substantial mismatch between the norms and 
standards used and promoted by the SCO and 
those by the EU, especially in the sphere of 
counterterrorism.5  
When it comes to cooperation on connectivity, 
and in particular, transport infrastructure, China 
is - for obvious reasons - the main external 
partner that the EU is now considering 
cooperating with in Central Asia. Nevertheless, 
given Russia’s interest in aligning with the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as Russia’s 
pivotal geographical location along the 
continental land bridge that China is seeking to 
establish, the EU might also seek to cooperate 
with Russia on connectivity. In particular, joint 
financing of infrastructure projects could be 
considered between the EU, the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
and the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB). 
However, the EU insists that for any joint 
projects on connectivity, the implementing 
partners will need to abide by the market-based 
principles and international norms, including 
transparency and sustainability (Bossuyt and 
Bolgova 2019). 
Barriers to Cooperation 
Although there are several areas that hold 
considerable potential for possible cooperation 
between the EU and Russia in Central Asia, it is 
important to be realistic about the likelihood of 
cooperation materialising in the short term, as a 
5 Interviews with EU officials, August-September 2019.  
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number of persistent obstacles seem to stand in 
the way.  
First, despite the ongoing dialogue and 
exchange of information on Central Asia 
between EU and Russian officials at various 
levels, there is a serious lack of trust between 
both sides, which undermines any attempt to 
cooperate. Both actors perceive each other not 
only as possible partners in the region, but also 
as potential spoilers. 
Moreover, despite EU cooperation with Russia 
in Central Asia being formally possible based on 
the EU’s principle of selective engagement and 
its ambition of having a non-exclusive 
partnership with Central Asia, some EU member 
states interpret the principle of selective 
engagement with Russia in a very restrictive 
manner, even excluding practical cooperation 
in areas where there is a clear common interest, 
such as in the Arctic (Van der Togt 2020). These 
are mostly EU member states which, based on 
their own historical experiences with Russia, 
believe that the Ukraine crisis has confirmed the 
failure of a cooperative approach towards 
Russia. Therefore, they remain vehemently 
opposed to any formal cooperation between 
the EU and Russia as long as Russia does not 
fulfil its commitments under the Minsk 
agreements. 
Another obstacle to cooperation is the 
abundance of (highly effective) misinformation 
and fake news on the EU, which is being spread 
in Central Asia through Russian popular and 
social media. As these fake narratives are 
negatively affecting perceptions of the EU 
amongst the Central Asian population, this 
situation is obviously not conducive for any 
attempt at building trust between the EU and 
Russia. Common narratives include that of 
‘Gayropa’ and that of the EU being in a state of 
perpetual crisis.  
Finally, although Russia and the EU have a 
common interest in a stable, secure and 
prosperous Central Asia, they have a rather 
diverging understanding of, and approach to, 
stability, security and prosperity. Russia equates 
stability in Central Asia with the status quo, and 
it upholds the idea that Central Asia is not ready 
for democracy. In Russia’s view, democracy 
would even be counterproductive and would 
destabilise the region. Moreover, Russia 
promotes the principles of sovereignty and non-
interference in domestic governance. As such, 
the development aid it offers to the region does 
not target governance issues. In contrast, the EU 
envisions the achievement of stability in Central 
Asia through inclusive and sustainable 
development, and it believes development in 
the region can only be durable if accompanied 
with enhancements in governance. This 
fundamental divergence in terms of approaches 
and understandings with respect to their 
common interests in Central Asia can contribute 
to misunderstanding between the EU and 
Russia, which is likely to undermine attempts to 
cooperate. 
Policy Recommendations 
The persistent barriers for cooperation 
described above may instil little hope that 
cooperation between the EU and Russia will 
materialise in the short term. Nevertheless, it is 
important to keep in mind that in a number of 
specific policy areas cooperation between the 
EU and Russia holds significant potential, in 
terms of contributing to the stability and 
prosperity of the region, because of the strong 
complementarity of their expertise and 
capabilities. This is also why both EU and 
Russian officials believe that it would be 
beneficial to cooperate in Central Asia. In 
specific areas, such as border management and 
anti-drugs trafficking, joining forces would 
amplify the likelihood of having a positive and 
lasting effect compared to acting 
independently. This could create a win-win 
situation, with tangible benefits for the Central 
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Asian countries. In order to arrive at this 
situation, several concrete steps will need to be 
made: 
• Russia and the EU should keep the dialogue 
and exchange of information open, both at 
high diplomatic levels and at lower technical 
levels on the ground. This is necessary in 
order to address the lack of trust and hence 
to engender a more positive perception of 
each other. 
• Russia and the EU should identify areas of 
possible cooperation based on their 
common interests and complementary 
expertise and capabilities. Both sides have 
expressed their readiness to search for 
common areas to cooperate. This expression 
of interest should be seized upon as an 
important first step towards possible 
cooperation. 
• EU officials should try to convince those EU 
member states, which are reluctant to allow 
the EU to engage with Russia on the basis of 
selective engagement, of the positive effects 
that EU-Russian cooperation can yield for the 
EU’s involvement in Central Asia, namely a 
win-win situation for all parties concerned, 
not least for the main beneficiaries, i.e. the 
Central Asian societies.  
• As it is unlikely that Russia will itself address 
the spread of misinformation and fake news 
on the EU that is circulated via Russian 
popular and social media, the EU should 
increase its efforts at enhancing awareness 
among the Central Asian population of fake 
news and misinformation. The EU should also 
invest more in media campaigns and other 
channels that can help to improve its 
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